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Tom Regan (1938-2017) is by most accounts one of the most influential contributors to 
modern animal ethics. At the same time, it’s fair to state that his influence on the animal 
rights movement as a whole may not be as strong as that of, say, Peter Singer or even 
Gary Francione. This is due in part to the ambitious nature of his work, especially his 
classic The Case for Animal Rights (Berkeley: The University of California Press), first 
published in 1983 and republished in 2004 with an important new preface responding 
to objections. Regan’s philosophical writings often lack the accessibility, simplicity, and 
concision of Peter Singer’s Animal Liberation. As a result, many animal rights advocates 
will claim that they have been influenced or brought into the movement after reading 
Animal Liberation, while fewer advocates, I think it is reasonable to say, would credit 
Regan with a comparable influence—which is ironic since the views of these advocates 
tend to be much more closely aligned with Regan’s abolitionism than with Singer’s utili-
tarianism (setting aside the fact that Animal Liberation makes no appeal to utilitarian as-
sumptions). However, this tells us little about the importance of Regan’s work and his im-
mense influence on at least two generations of philosophers and animal studies scholars. 
To my knowledge, the collection The Moral Rights of Animals is the first wide-ranging 
set of explorations of Regan’s views on animal rights—their importance, their implica-
tions, their imperfections, and more generally their potential for furthering discussion of 
major practical issues such as animal experimentation, animal agriculture, and hunting, 
as well as major theoretical and underlying issues such as the respective values of hu-
man and animal lives, speciesism, or the idea of rights. The volume is divided into three 
parts: I. Theoretical Prospects and Challenges for Animal Rights, II. Animal Rights and 
the Comparative Value of Lives, and III. Animal Rights in Practice. The commonalities 
throughout the book are sometimes more striking than their differences, which, to me, 
reveals both the unity of Regan’s thought and the inescapability of its central questions. 
The book also includes a helpful overview by editors Mylan Engel Jr. and Gary Comstock 
(both of whom also contribute to the volume) and an evocative “Appreciation” by Jeff 
McMahan.
This is an important collection that will prove to be a useful resource to both animal eth-
ics scholars and students, who will enjoy the clarity and accessibility of many chapters. 
Below I briefly summarize Regan’s theory of animal rights, and highlight what I take to 
be the most salient contributions of the book.
Regan’s work on animals in The Case for Animal Rights as well as in prior and subsequent 
publications is a prolonged defense of the idea that many nonhuman animals have moral 
rights. Incidentally, this has entailed refutations of a range of views denying animals di-
rect moral status, including contractarianism, Kantianism, indirect duties views, egoism, 
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and ecocentrism, but also a vigorous, persistent opposition to Singer’s utilitarianism. Re-
gan is on many counts one of Singer’s staunchest critics even while they largely—though 
not fully—agree in practice about the implications of their respective views concerning 
the use of animals for food, experimentation, or entertainment. 
The central tenets of Regan’s theory lie in two notions: the morally relevant criterion of 
being a “subject-of-a-life” and a fundamental deontological principle constraining moral 
deliberation and action, the Respect Principle.
To be a subject-of-a-life … involves more than merely being alive and more 
than merely being conscious … [I]ndividuals are subjects-of-a-life if they have 
beliefs and desires; perceptions, memory, and a sense of the future, including 
their own future; an emotional life together with feelings of pleasure and pain; 
preference- and welfare-interests; the ability to initiate action in pursuit of 
their desires and goals; a psychophysical identity over time; and an individual 
welfare in the sense that their experiential life fares well or ill for them. (The 
Case for Animal Rights, p. 243)
By virtue of being a subject-of-a-life, a human or nonhuman animal is a moral patient 
with inherent value, which is distinct from the intrinsic value of the experiences their 
lives contain. Inherent value is equally possessed by all moral patients, even when they 
lack the rational capacities to be held responsible as moral agents. On the Respect Prin-
ciple, inherent value gives rise to a fundamental right to respect which, among other 
things, entails a right not to be used as a mere means (e.g. as a mere receptacle of val-
ue) or to be harmed for the promotion of the overall good. The contrast between the 
rights-theory and its strongest and most direct rival, utilitarianism, could not be clearer. 
Whether one counts the rights-theory as a variant of deontology or another type of non-
consequentialism, Regan’s theory is all but absolutist, which in practice yields qualified 
abolitionism. Rights admit of no exception. For example, no consideration of value can 
justify moral agents violating them, even if ancillary principles—Miniride and Worst-
Off—allow for the resolution of conflicts between rights by causing or allowing harm to 
some for the sake of others in ways supposedly consistent with the Respect Principle. In 
practice this means the abolition of all forms of animal experimentation, animal agricul-
ture, and use of animals in zoos and circuses.
Most rights can be derived from the Respect Principle, although it is not entirely clear 
whether they are independent rights or particular implications of the right not to be 
harmed. For instance, is the right to life just a component of the latter (death being the 
greatest of all harms according to Regan), or does it simply derive from the right to re-
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spect such that killing moral patients wrongs them regardless of whether and to what 
extent it harms them? Regan’s theory also focuses on negative rights and duties of justice, 
and therefore leaves it open whether moral patients also have positive rights (e.g. to as-
sistance), on what grounds, and if negative rights could ever be trumped by our positive 
duties of beneficence or charity. Finally, what is the relation between the respective val-
ues of lives and the equality of rights? 
Many contributions to this volume bring much welcome clarifications and sometimes 
even compelling answers to these questions. Most chapters also do not presuppose 
familiarity with Regan’s views, which makes the discussions widely accessible.
An essay by Regan that summarizes his argument for the basic moral rights of all 
subjects-of-a-life opens Part 1. In Chapter 2, Jeremy Garrett argues that deontological 
libertarians, despite their historical reluctance, should welcome Regan’s rights-theory as 
it is consistent with their view. In Chapter 3, Mylan Engel Jr. argues that, if all humans 
have moral rights, then many other animals also do and that rebuttals of this view pre-
suppose either nihilism about rights or unwarranted forms of human exceptionalism.  
Furthermore, even if humans and animals had no rights, our current uses of animals 
could not be justified. In Chapter 4, Nathan Nobis sets out to offer stronger responses 
than Regan’s to Carl Cohen’s “kind” argument for human exceptionalism. In Chapter 5, 
Anne Baril, drawing on the concept of eudaimonia in virtue ethics, argues that Regan’s 
theory is not committed to a duty to assist wild animals against predation and other 
natural threats, insofar as our duty of respect entails respect for the kinds of beings 
whose flourishing involves navigating their environment autonomously.
The main focus of Part 2 is the comparative assessment of the harm of death across 
species. In Chapter 6, Aaron Simmons argues animals have an equal right to life even 
though their life typically has less value than human life. In Chapter 7, Molly Gardner 
offers an “attenuated rights view” with a weighing component, which she argues is 
more plausible than Regan’s and does not yield a categorical prohibition of all harmful 
animal experimentation. In Chapter 8, Evelyn Pluhar updates Regan’s theory draw-
ing on the recent literature on animal minds and behavior to include all vertebrates 
and some invertebrates in the scope of subjects-of-a-life with an equal right to life. In 
Chapter 9, Alastair Norcross develops an original combination of Singer’s equal con-
sideration view based on sentience with Regan’s view, such that self-conscious creatures 
(i.e. subjects-of-a-life) are harmed more by death than simply sentient creatures. In 
Chapter 10, Gary Comstock draws on 18th century materialist philosopher La Mettrie 
and recent empirical work to suggest that, more often than not, human behavior is 
driven by automatic, non-conscious processes, and is therefore more similar to animal 
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behavior than we usually think. Comstock’s strategy reverses the more usual approach 
that emphasizes animals’ similarities to us.
Part 3 turns to a variety of practical topics. In Chapter 11, Ramona Ilea argues that 
Nussbaum’s Capabilities Approach could serve as a rigorous concrete application of 
Regan’s view in public policy contexts. In Chapter 12, Scott Wilson dissents from many 
other contributors and adduces a range of reasons (from culture and symbols to rela-
tionships and self-conception to convenience) for counting many people’s interests in 
eating meat as more significant than is typically assumed. However, he shows that these 
interests undermine utilitarian arguments but not rights-based arguments for vegetari-
anism. In Chapter 13, Robert Bass makes an argument from moral caution for vegan-
ism: if there is a reasonable chance that X is seriously wrong and hardly any chance 
that it is morally required, then we ought not to do X. It follows that eating meat is very 
likely wrong. In Chapter 14, Jason Hanna offers a careful reading of Regan’s view to re-
ject Gary Varner’s argument that animal rights are consistent with either welfare-based 
therapeutic hunting or subsistence hunting. 
 
Some of the discussions in the volume address the scope of the subject-of-a-life crite-
rion as well as “the benefit of the doubt” that Regan gave to animals such as birds and 
fish which, at the time he was composing The Case, were believed at best to be prob-
ably sentient but clearly not subjects-of-a-life. In fact, two revisions may be warranted 
today: a revision of the criterion itself and one of the empirical claims about which 
animals meet the relevant criteria. We now know more about animal cognition than 
Regan did in 1983 and so are warranted in counting positively more animals as moral 
patients than he did, but we may also want to have rights depend on less a demanding 
criterion than the one sketched above. Let me take an example from Alastair Norcross’s 
chapter. His two-tier view of the harm of death elegantly combines Regan’s egalitarian 
subject-of-a-life criterion with the utilitarian rationale for weighing interests depending 
on their strengths (or complexity) rather than whose interests they are. Merely sentient 
animals and subjects-of-a-life can be harmed by death differentially because death 
matters to the latter in a way that it does not matter to the former. But sentience is both 
necessary and sufficient for moral considerability. Regan’s criterion explains why some 
actions are more harmful to some than they are to others, but a less demanding criteri-
on—sentience—may be sufficient to account for the inherent value and right to respect 
of all moral patients. 
This is an important collection, perhaps not so much for its contribution to Reganesque 
scholarship as for its independently valuable attempts to draw on Regan’s insights and 
imperfections in support of robust animal rights-theory. While nearly all contributions 
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presuppose at some point the truth of at least some fundamental tenets of the rights-
theory, one need not share those to find these discussions illuminating.
Exegetic contributions as well as those that rehearse well-worn debates between Regan 
and opponents of animal rights (esp. Cohen) or board yet another time the infamous 
lifeboats were to me the least engaging. It is not clear that much time needs to be spent 
again refuting Cohen’s case against the direct moral standing of animals, or that lifeboat 
cases should be taken as decisive expressions of Regan’s theory and its practical import—
as he himself warns in the 2004 preface to The Case.  I was more engaged, and to some 
extent compelled by more innovative attempts to reconcile or combine his theory with 
the views of others (e.g. Jeremy Garrett’s “Animal rights for libertarians”; Ramona Ilea’s 
“Rights and capabilities”), to diagnose its failure to accommodate some of our intuitions, 
(Molly Gardner’s “The interspecies killing problem”), or to carefully articulate the ver-
dicts of the rights-theory on practical matters such as therapeutic and subsistence hunt-
ing (Jason Hanna’s “A moral license to kill?”).
In decades to come, I expect that Regan’s legacy will be less in the soundness of his own 
arguments than in their success in generating a wealth of nuanced and technical, yet 
practically relevant discussions of the moral rights of animals, as evidenced by this wel-
come companion to Regan’s theory of animal rights. The range of philosophical views 
otherwise endorsed by the contributors is itself striking evidence of the influence of Re-
gan on generations of philosophers across the board. And it is no disrespect, indeed it 
is a tribute, to his thought and legacy that his work should still generate such lively and 
profound disagreement. 
